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In an opinion on rehearing reversing its original holding,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine that a separation
from bed and board may not be granted for cause where "the
faults of the husband and wife are nearly balanced and are of a
similar nature."' By petition and reconvention the wife and
husband each had sought a separation from the other on the
ground of cruel treatment rendering the common life insupport-
able. Each was deemed to have proved the charge. The/ lower
court nevertheless granted the separation to the plaintiff wife.
In its original opinion the Supreme Court upheld this action,
clearly departing from the long observed judicial custom of not
allowing a separation or divorce in instances of mutual fault,
but reversed itself on rehearing.
The proper application of the doctrine of mutual fault, or
recrimination as it is often called, needs re-evaluation. In prin-
ciple it is inconsistent with the whole trend of Louisiana divorce
and separation legislation since 1898, for as of that date it be-
came possible for one at fault in bringing about a marital dif-
ficulty to ask for and receive a divorce. Prior to 1898 a party at
fault could never obtain a divorce at his own request, even if a
separation had been pronounced in favor of the other spouse,
no matter how long the non-reconciliation of the spouses lasted.2
Since 1898, however, the guilty spouse has been able to demand a
divorce after a certain period of time has elapsed after the judg-
ment of separation if no reconciliation has taken place.8 In 1916
the Legislature made it possible to obtain a divorce after a
period of factual "living separate and apart," without reference
to the cause, reason, or occasion for the separation so long as it
*Profesaor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Fouquier v. Fouquier, 231 La. 430, 91 So.2d 591 (1956).
2. LA. CIvIL Cowe art. 139 (1870) as originally enacted.
3. La. Acts 1898, No. 25, the first antecedent of LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950).
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were voluntary in its inception on the part of at least one of
the parties.4 Finally in 1956 even a separation from bed and
board was made obtainable after a "voluntary separation" of one
year.5
Hence it is that side by side with divorce and separation
for fault of the defendant there is legislation permitting divorce
and separation without reference to fault. Not only are the two
kinds of legislation inconsistent in principle; but, because they
exist side by side, suits for divorce and separation for cause serve
only to lessen the time that otherwise might be required for ob-
taining a final judgment; and at the same time any separation
or divorce suit based on cause which fails can be followed very
shortly by one based on "voluntary separation" or "living sep-
arate and apart." For this reason it is to be suspected that
many judges in the lower courts, on being confronted with in-
stances of common fault in suits for divorce or separation for
cause, respond actually, if not openly, as did the Supreme Court
in its original opinion in the case under discussion. In such
cases the doctrine of mutual fault is applied only if the de-
fendant appeals, and by the time of decision on appeal sufficient
time will have elapsed to make possible a suit for separation or
divorce on the ground of voluntary separation or living separate
and apart.
Yet if separation or divorce for cause in the nature of fault
is inconsistent in principle with separation or divorce without
regard to fault, that is to say, in our law, on the basis of "volun-
tary separation" or "living separate and apart," it is true that
it is only for cause in the nature of fault that a separation or
divorce may be obtained in less time than one year or two years
respectively. Hence, unless separation and divorce without cause
are to become possible in fact in less than one or two years, the
regime of separation or divorce for cause in the nature of fault
must be enforced as if the other did not exist. This leads us,
then, to the necessity of being concerned with this doctrine of
mutual fault and its proper application.
In my opinion two distinct kinds of fault must be distin-
guished, that which is a past fact and does not amount to a con-
4. La. Acts 1916, No. 269, the first antecedent of LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950), as
interpreted by Leveque v. Borns, 174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932) and Otis v.
Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So.2d 146 (1946).
5. LA. Civn CoDE art. 138 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1956, No. 303.
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tinuing, present situation rendering the common life intolerable,
and fault of a kind which continues to exist as of the time of
suit and which makes the common life intolerable. In the first
instance, mutual fault should be reason to deny a separation or
divorce. If, for example, both spouses have committed adultery
in the past and there is no present habitual adultery on the part
of either, it would seem that a separation or divorce should not
be granted. On the other hand, if, as in the case which prompted
this discussion, both spouses are so habitually cruel toward each
other that the conjugal life is insupportable, then it seems that
the mutuality of fault should not be a reason to deny the sep-
aration. Here care would have to be taken to minimize the pos-
sibility of collusion, but a separation in cases of genuine mutual
cruel treatment may be indicated to prevent even more disastrous
consequences than the separation would entail. It may be noted
that this is the way in which the doctrine of mutual fault seems
to be applied in Canon law."
Cruel Treatment
Three decisions presented questions of existence of cruel
treatment of such a nature as to render the common life in-
supportable. In the case above discussed "constant quarrelling
and bickering in private and in public" was impliedly so con-
strued.7 In another (in which, however, the charge of cruel treat-
ment was coupled with another of public defamation) absenting
himself from the house without explanation, abusive language,
and refusal to have meals with the other or to occupy the con-
jugal bed, all over a period of only four months, were deemed
sufficient to support the charge." In the third, the firing of a
gun to frighten the husband, not in attempt on his life, and on a
single instance, was adjudged to render the common life insup-
portable.9
If it were not for the fact that under Louisiana law taken
in its entirety separation from bed and board leads to divorce
more than it affords an opportunity for reconciliation, I might
join in the sentiment that separations might be allowable under
such facts. The separation would then provide a means of bring-
6. The Codem Jure Canonici, Canon 1129, makes separation for adultery im-
possible if the plaintiff has committed the same offense. There is no mention of
mutuality of fault in Canon 1131 dealing with the other grounds for separation.
7. Fouquier v. Fouquier, 231 La. 430, 91 So.2d 591 (1956).
8. MeNeal v. McNeal, 96 So.2d 563 (La. 1957).
9. Amos v. Amos, 232 La. 178, 94 So.2d 23 (1957).
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ing the erring spouse to his senses. Realizing, however, that
under the impact of Louisiana law in its totality separation
breeds divorce more than it provides a period of reflection for
reconciliation, I think it would be well to require the highest de-
gree of proof of insupportability of the common life before
granting a judgment of separation. The mere fact that parties
denied a separation for cause may soon thereafter file for di-
vorce or separation on grounds of "living separate and apart"
or "voluntary separation," as heretofore mentioned, ought, in my
mind, be considered reason enough not to be too free in granting
divorces or separations for cause.
Proof of Cause
An admission by the defendant of the existence of grounds
for divorce, separation, or annulment of marriage could not be
allowed to suffice in place of proof of cause in fact without open-
ing the way for collusion of the parties and action by common
consent rather than for legal cause. This indeed must be con-
sidered the reason for our long-standing rule that such suits may
not be made the subject of arbitration, but must be tried in
courts of justice.10 Even more obviously, it must be the reason
for the newer rule that a divorce, separation, or annulment may
not be granted on the face of the pleadings, but only after proof
is made of the existence of legal cause." For these reasons, the
language in Williams v. Williams 2 that "in her answer filed to
the petition there was no denial of the two year separation al-
legation and it, therefore, is deemed admitted" must be deemed
contrary to law. It is true that the Supreme Court did not rely'
entirely on this admission for proof of the living separate and
apart, for there was some testimony to this effect by third per-
sons. 1 It would seem, nevertheless, that the admission of the
defendant should not be used even to corroborate other evidence;
for either the other evidence presented is itself sufficiently pro-
bative, or in fact proof is made at least in part by means pro-
10. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 140 (1870).
11. LA. R.5. 13:3601(4) (1950).
12. 231 La. 621, 92 So.2d 387 (1957).
13. The defendant-appellant contended this testimony was "insufficient to justi-
fy judgment" on the ground that on cross examination the witnesses could not state
the whereabouts of the plaintiff at all times. This contention was dismissed on the
ground it related to the credibility of the witness, which the trial judge could
appraise better than the Supreme Court. Perhaps credibility was an issue, but if
so it was not the basis of the defendant-appellant's appeal. No matter how credible
a witness, the evidence which he gives may not be probative, or, in the defendant-
appellant's terms, sufficient to justify judgment.
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hibited by law and certainly too easily suppliable by one who
would not hesitate to work a fraud on the law.
For the proof of adultery in divorce suits the Supreme Court
long has required that the evidence "lead fairly and necessarily"
to the conclusion that adultery has been committed. This cri-
terion was applied in two cases. In one of these, Justice Hamiter
dissented from the finding of adultery on the ground that in his
opinion the evidence did not "lead fairly and necessarily" to that
conclusion. 14 It is impossible to discuss the merits of the decision
and dissent, however, for the facts are not reported in the
opinion. From the evidence as reported in the other case apply-
ing the same standard, however, it would seem that the court
did, and very rightly, require a high degree of proof.'5
DoMICILE
Intrastate Domicile of the Wife
Article 39 of the Louisiana Civil Code states very clearly that
a married woman "has no other domicile than that of her hus-
band." Notwithstanding this emphatically stated legislation, the
Supreme Court has decided she may have.16 Evidently the court
confused two radically distinct connotations of the word domi-
cile. One is domicile in the legal sense, the legal "home base"
which is one of the principal criteria of the ties between a person
and a legislative or judicial competence; the other is a house or
dwelling. It is true the husband and wife may have separate
homes in fact, but that does not lead necessarily to the conclu-
sion they must have separate domiciles in the legal sense. 17
14. Bailey v. Bailey, 96 So.2d 576 (La. 1957).
15. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 96 So.2d 12 (1957).
16. Bush v. Bush, 232 La. 747, 95 So.2d 298 (1957).
17. From the opinion it appears that the court rejected the argument that
Article 39 of the Louisiana Civil Code applies only to intrastate or interparish
domicile, not to interstate or international domicile, and therefore that a recog-
nition of the strictness of Article 39 would not in any way contradict the juris-
prudence on the possibility of the wife having a separate interstate or interna-
tional domicile. In my opinion the argument is sound. Domicile is one of the
criteria of state authority (or jurisdiction) to legislate or adjudicate as to a par-
ticular person or situation. Interstate jurisdiction is, under the Constitution of
the United States, a matter of full faith and credit and for this reason the criteria
of jurisdiction (or full faith and credit) must be a matter of federal law, not
state law. If it were otherwise, full faith and credit would have no meaning, for
each state in defining its own criteria for jurisdiction could defeat the purpose of
the clause. This understanding is indeed the basis of such decisions as Alton v.
Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1953) and Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349
U.S. 1 (1955). There is no supra-state legislation like the full faith and credit
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The case under discussion really concerned only the issue
whether a suit for divorce against a wife must be filed in the
parish in which she resides, a parish not that of the domicile
of the husband. Perhaps the Legislature would agree with the
Supreme Court that all divorce or separation suits should be
filed in the parish of the wife's actual residence, as it has in
R.S. 9:301 for the limited case of divorce on the ground of living
separate, and apart; but this, I suggest, is a question for legisla-
tive determination.
Interstate Domicile
In a second case involving domicile the Supreme Court very
correctly noted the distinction between the acquisition of a domi-
cile in another state and the satisfaction of requirements as to
the length of time a person domiciled in a state must have resided
there in order to sue for a divorce or separation under the laws
of that state. The one may be obtained immediately upon the
concurrence of physical presence in a state with the intention of
making that state the center of one's activities. Residence re-
quirements depend entirely on the satisfaction of local laws on
that subject. Whether the court was correct in the application
of these legal verities to the facts of the case, however, is a
matter open to some doubt on the basis of the facts as reported
in the opinion; but this is not a matter of primary concern in an
article dealing with the court's enunciations on the law.I8
clause to delineate the legislative and judicial competences of independent states
and countries, and indeed different countries have enacted their own criteria of
jurisdiction in the form of conflict of law rules, but the same principle must be
understood to apply if there is to be any serious effort for a body of private inter-
national law or conflict of laws rules. Thus it would be beyond the power of a
state of the.union to enact a criterion of interstate legislative or judicial compe-
tence, and most inappropriate for it to vary the general appreciation of interna-
tionally held criteria by its own legislation.
18. The plaintiff sought a divorce on the ground of living separate and apart
from his wife for two years. R.S. 9:301 as interpreted requires that a party have
been domiciled in this state for two years preceding suit. Less than two years
before suit in Louisiana the plaintiff, then domiciled in Louisiana, had gone to
Nevada with the intention of filing suit for divorce in that jurisdicton. Whether
or not he had acquired a Nevada domicile, the plaintiff returned to Louisiana be-
fore having resided there six weeks as required by Nevada laws as a precondition
to the filing of divorce suits by Nevada domiciliaries. The fact that the plaintiff
had gone to Nevada to file suit, however, is not, in my opinion, necessarily synony-
mous with intention on his part to establish a: domicile there. It is well known that
many persons *go to Nevada to obtain divorces without ever in fact wishing to
establish a domicile there; indeed, the case of Williams v. N. Carolina (I), 317
U.S. 287' (1942) amounts to a recognition of this practice. From the report of
facts such as we have it in the opinion, therefore, it would seem that the court





Two appeals"' from judgments concerning alimony after
divorce raised the issue whether the divorced wives were "in
necessitous circumstances" within the meaning of Article 160
of the Civil Code. In each case the court reaffirmed its previous
interpretation of that phrase.20 It may be mentioned, however,
that in each opinion the court repeated once more the statement
that alimony to the wife after divorce is a "pure gratuity which
the court may allow and fix at its discretion." This kind of state-
ment can give rise to the impression the Supreme Court wishes
to justify whatever it does in awarding alimony after divorce
by denying that the wife, though in necessitous circumstances,
has any right to alimony. Certainly the court cannot intend this
meaning any more than it would be conceivable that the legis-
latures since 182721 intended to grant such power to the judi-
ciary. It would seem more reasonable to recognize that Article
160 creates a right to alimony in favor of the divorced wife in
necessitous circumstances, and gives discretion to the judge only
as to the amount to be paid.
Criminal Neglect of Family
Prosecution for criminal neglect of family was adjudged not
terminated by the filing of suits for annulment of the accused's
marriage with his "wife" or for disavowal of the child for whose
support an order had been issued pursuant to R.S. 14:75. The
court very properly reasoned that if such were the case the ac-
cused could very easily and quickly rid himself of this criminal
charge to the detriment of persons very possibly then his wife
or child.2 2 The court did not deny, of course, that a judgment of
nullity of marriage would have put an end to the accusation of
criminal neglect of the wife, or that a judgment of non-paternity
would have terminated the proceeding for failure to support the
child.
19. Jones v. Jones, 232 La. 102, 93 So.2d 917 (1957) ; Rabun v. Rabun, 232
La. 1004, 95 So.2d 635 (1957).
20. In Brown v. Harris, 225 La. 320, 72 So.2d 746 (1954) ; Smith v. Smith,
217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950).
21. The first legislation of this kind was in the Act of March 19, 1827, 1 S.
22. State v. Ponthieaux, 232 La. 121, 94 So.2d 3 (1957).
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Interstate Enforcement of Support
The so-called Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act2 8 permits inter alia a dependent to bring a civil suit for sup-
port in his own state against a person in another state who is
obliged to supply that support. Similar legislation exists in
California and under it a mother initiated proceedings against
her child's father for its support. Without citing the defendant
in any way the California court proceeded to receive proof of
the plaintiff's allegations and then sent copies of the petition and
proceedings to the Louisiana court in the parish of the defend-
ant's domicile. The defendant was served with copies of the doc-
uments, answered denying the child's need, and a hearing was
held after which the Louisiana court entered an order for sup-
port solely on the basis of the evidence introduced during the
California proceedings. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
and set aside the judgment on the ground that it was founded
entirely on an ex parte statement, a statement not admissible as
evidence. This seems correct. The Uniform Enforcement of Sup-
port Act is designed to facilitate interstate support proceedings
by permitting a dependent to initiate suit in his state and to
elicit the assistance of public prosecutors in the state of the de-
fendant's domicile in the actual prosecution of the cause at that
place. It cannot be considered a procedure which would deny to
the defendant the same opportunity to defend the suit that he




A person sought to set aside two ex parte judgments recog-
nizing another as heir of a certain deceased by offering to prove
he was -the legitimate son of the deceased.2 4 The defendant ap-
parently admitted the plaintiff was the son of the deceased, but
denied he was the child of her husband. 25 Inasmuch as the child
had been reared by both its mother and her husband as-their own
it "possessed the status" or reputation of legitimacy and, having
been conceived and born during their marriage and never dis-
23. LA. R.8. 13:1641-1673 (1950).
24. Succession of Rockwood, 231 La. 521, 91 So.2d 779 (1956).
25. Apparently, for the opinion is rather vague on this point.
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avowed, his legitimacy could not be questioned.2 The Supreme
Court relied in fact on the child's having been reared'as a legiti-
mate child, citing Article 194 of the Civil Code, and also on a
birth registry made by the midwife indicating his legitimate
filiation, citing Article 193 of the Civil Code, but did not resort
to the presumption of legitimacy resulting from marriage,
though in this case it would seem to have been the strongest
legal reason for adjudging the child legitimate. A birth registra-
tion made by a physician, midwife, or even the mother, after all,
may properly serve as evidence of the-maternity of the child, but
hardly is proof of his paternity. Indeed, from the provisions of
the Civil Code itself it is clear that a birth registry indicating
the husband as the father of the child would not be conclusive
against him unless he signed it.27
CUSTODY
After Separation or Divorce of Parents
After the separation from bed and board or the divorce of
the parents, the custody of a child is governed by Article 157 of
the Civil Code. For some years this rule has been interpreted
liberally as a "best welfare of the child" rule, and two decisions
of the last term applied this interpretation of the article.28
During Marriage
During the marriage of the parents the custody of their child
belongs to them as a matter of law,29 and even after separation
from bed and board or divorce it belongs to one of them,80 unless
because of the child's delinquency, or its neglect, mistreatment,
or abandonment, custody has been given another by judgment of
a proper court.A1 Thus it would seem that any time the married
parents, or the separated or divorced parent with right to cus-
tody, seek to recover the custody of their children from those who
have it under circumstances other than a judgment of custody,
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 184 et seq. (1870).
27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 190 (1870).
28. Bailey v. Bailey, 96 So.2d 576 (La. 1957) ; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 232
La. 916, 95 So.2d 497 (1957).
29. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 216 (1870).
30. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 157 (1870).
31. Until 1956 the district courts shared some of the jurisdiction with the
juvenile courts under R.S. 9:511-553, but this legislation was repealed by La.
Acts 1956, No. 111, leaving the juvenile courts with exclusive jurisdiction in this
matter over minors under seventeen, and eliminating all legislation on this subject
as to minors over seventeen.
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they should be entitled to obtain it of right. The Supreme Court
recognized this in the course of its opinion in a custody suit ini-
tiated, in a district court as a habeas corpus proceeding, by mar-
ried parents,82 but nevertheless proceeded to leave the child tem-
porarily in the custody of the respondents because by the time
of the appeal the parents had begun to live separate and apart.
It is true the Supreme Court acted in accordance with what it
deemed the best interest of the child in a kind of situatiomnot.
specifically covered by the written law, for there is no specific
legislation on the right of custody during a separation in fact;
but it seems that as between awarding custody to one of the par-
ents or to persons not parents, the decision in favor of one not
a parent cannot be justified. Short of proof of delinquency, neg-
lect, abuse, or abandonment, parents have exclusive right to the
custody of their children.
ADOPTION
The decisions on adoption reflected radically different appre-
ciations of the effect of the adoption legislation on the rest of the
law relative to children. One reaffirmed the opinion in Green v.
Paul8 that parents may withdraw their consent to the adoption
of their child by others at any time before final judgment ;34 a
second interpreted the adoption legislation to require the consent
of both natural parents even if the custody of the child previous-
ly had been awarded one of them ;35 and a third held that a child
both of whose parents were dead could be adopted without the
consent, and indeed against the opposition, of other relatives.86
The first two decisions represent conclusions based on a strict,
or limiting, interpretation of the adoption legislation to preserve
parental right to children; on the theory adoption legislation is
a variation or modification of long recognized rights as to chil-
dren, it was given a narrow, particular meaning, reducing its
effect to what must be considered authorized by its texts. Ob-
viously, the third-mentioned decision proceeded as if upon a
broad, all-embracing, policy-making conception of the adoption
legislation with the result that family, as distinguished from
parental, rights to children not preserved in the adoption legis-
lation were considered repealed. Certainly Civil Code Article 213
32. State v. Miller, 232 La. 617, 94 So.2d 888 (1957).
33. 212 La. 337, 31 So.2d 819 (1947).
34. In re Harville, 96 So.2d 25 (La. 1957).
35. Madere v. Long, 231 La. 498, 91 So.2d 771 (1956).
36. In re Ryals, 231 La. 683, 92 So.2d 581 (1957).
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as originally written implied family rights to children by recog-
nizing the right of other relatives to claim the tutorship of chil-
dren abandoned by their parents even against the persons who
had cared for them. The repeal of this article in 194837 no doubt
operates somewhat to disassociate the child from his family and
to increase the wardship of impersonal state agencies. The de-
cision presently under consideration will have a similar effect.
Both, however, are to be deplored as further manifestations of
a decreased appreciation for the stability and integrity of the
family unit, whether or not they were conceived as such by their
authors.
INTERDICTION
A single decision involving the law of interdiction presented





According to Article 675 of the Civil Code, he who first
builds in cities and towns may rest one-half of his wall on the
land of his neighbor. Another phase of the same servitude is the
right of the neighbor to make this a party wall and to utilize it
for the support of his own building. Of course, the first builder
does not have the right to encroach upon his neighbor's prop-
erty unless it is within the party wall servitude. In the case of
Ciaravella v. Gillaspie,' the plaintiff sought to have defendant
remove the wall of his building which enroached upon plaintiff's
property. The defendant pleaded the party wall servitude, but
since the wall did not meet the party wall specifications of the
New Orleans Building Code, the district court ordered the re-
moval. The Supreme Court conceded "that under the facts of
this case he [plaintiff] has a right to have the wall torn down,' 2
but nonetheless reversed the lower court's judgment and allowed
37. La. Acts 1948, No. 227, 1 7.
38. In re Taliaferro, 231 La. 394, 91 So.2d 578 (1956).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 96 So.2d 48 (La. 1957).
2. Id. at 52.
[Vol. XVIII
